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U.S. Military Accountability for 
Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts: 
An Examination of Okinawa, Envirorimental 
Justice, and Judicial Militarism 
Alan Ramo• 
Local resistance to the relocation of a US. military base to a bay threatening an t:ndangered 
sea I11llllll11/ll off the coast of the island of Okinawa raises importJmt issues regarding the 
extraterritoriality of US. environmt:nt1lllaws, the role of the courts in reviewing military operations, 
and ultimately t:nvironmt:nt1ll justice. These issues are being played out in an island community 
that for centuries has tried to survive by balancing the great powers of China, Japan, and the United 
States. 0./dnawans now find themselves a minority subject to discrimination in Japan and still 
suffering fiom the impacts of the legacy of US. occupation and continued use of US. bases on 
their culture, economy, and environment 
Federal courts continue to inconsistently sort out the extraterritoriality of US. laws, 
including environmt:nt1ll laws. Already one t&k:rai court has applied the National Historical 
Preservation Act to this controversy in Okinawa. Strong BlgU111t:nts remain that the National 
Environmt:nt1ll Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act should also apply to the US. military's 
actions in Okinawa. Although the modem United States Supreme Court has reversed earlier cases 
and given great deference to military operations, a fbrm of judicial militarism, t:nvironmt:nt1ll 
justice demands and case law allows these environmt:nt1lllaws to shape US. military conduct on 
Okinawa and protect its t:nvironmt:nt 
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But the Pentagon is not yet sovereign. The military is simply another 
administrative agency, insofar as judicial review is concerned. 
-Honorable William Douglas1 
Environmenflll Justice opposes military occupation, repression and 
exploitation oflands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms. 
-Principles ofEnvironmental Justice2 
But my job is to teach these natives the meaning of Democracy and they're 
going to learn Democracy if! have to shoot every one of them. 
- Fictional Col. Wainright Purdy lit 
1. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 51 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Comment, 
Military Tnal ofCiVI1ian Offenses: Drumhead Justice in the Land of the Free, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 
356, 377-78 (1970}). 
2. First Nat'! People of Color Envtl. Leadership Summit, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 24-27, 
1991); The Principles of EnVIivnmenflll Justice (EJ}, E NVTL JUST. REsOURCE CENTER, http:// 
www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.pdf (last updated Apr. 6, 1996). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A renewed battle over the proposed relocation of the United States 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma on the island of Okinawa, 
Japan, raises a web of issues regarding the U.S. military's environmental 
and, in particular, its environmental justice obligations abroad. It also 
raises profound issues about the role of the courts in overseeing military 
operations. To some extent, one can collapse these issues into the 
extraterritoriality of U.S. environmental laws. All of these questions 
focus upon an extremely endangered mammal barely surviving near a 
proposed military base expansion on an island that for hundreds of years 
has tried to find some autonomy and balance among competing great 
powers. 
What makes Okinawa such an interesting setting is its historical and 
judicial context. Okinawa has now "reverted" to Japan after U.S. 
occupation and centuries of influence and control by China and Japan. 
However, the United States continues to operate bases in Okinawa as a 
legacy of World War II and its dominant, nearly colonial, occupation of 
Okinawa. Bases remain in Okinawa because of perceived security 
threats from North Korea and China and the history of conflict in 
Southeast Asia. It thus remains a major force on the island.4 
For that reason, the ability of U.S. courts to oversee U.S. military 
operations is a critical question for the Okinawans. Federal courts 
continue to inconsistently sort out the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws, 
including environmental laws. Already, one federal court has applied the 
National Historical Preservation Act (NHPA) to this controversy in 
Okinawa.' Strong arguments remain that the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) should also 
apply to the U.S. military's actions in Okinawa. 
The modem United States Supreme Court has reversed earlier 
decisions and given great deference to military operations, establishing 
what this Article charges is a kind of 'judicial militarism." Thirty-two 
years ago, Justice Douglas could write the words quoted at the beginning 
of this Article calling the U.S. military just another administrative agency 
during the unpopular Vietnam War. Today, Chief Justice Roberts has no 
3. JOHN PATRICK, THETEAHOUSEOFTHEAUGUSTMOON act I, sc. I, at 13 (1957). 
4. This Article 's author became acquainted with Okinawa's history, environmental 
challenges, and struggle for self-determination and justice while serving there as a staff attorney 
for a nonprofit antiwar center representing U.S. military personnel during the latter years of the 
Vietnam War. 
5. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005). 
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hesitation to hold that military preparedness in the absence of a war is a 
sufficient basis to trump environmental laws even in U.S. coastal waters.6 
Nevertheless, this Article s_uggests that the __ text of binding U.S. 
environmental statutes, properly interpreted case law, and pQlicy based 
upon environmental justice standards allows U.S. environmental laws to 
shape U.S. military conduct on Okinawa and protect its environment. 
Part II of this Article provides a very brief overview of Okinawa's history. 
Part III discusses the U.S. military occupation and Okinawa's reversion to 
Japan. Part IV focuses on the political and legal conflict surrounding the 
relocation of the MCAS Futenma. Part V examines the extraterritoriality 
of two applicable U.S. environmental laws. Part VI attempts to reconcile 
the law of extraterritoriality, the demands of environmental justice in 
Okinawa, and what I describe as the philosophy of judicial militarism in 
the federal courts. 
II. OKINAWAN HISTORY 
"[T]he postwar 'Okinawa problem' was produced by events set in 
train long ago by accidents of geography and history."' Okinawa is the 
largest island of Japan's Okinawa Prefecture's more than 160 islands, 
known as the Ryukyu Islands or archipelago.8 Known as the "Keystone 
of the Pacific," it is located strategically, often to its peril, between Japan, 
China, Taiwan, and South and North Korea.9 
"The Ryiikyiian are an indigenous group of people[]."10 Okinawa 
currently has 1.4 million people in the Prefecture. 11 The people speak 
distinct languages. Okinawans have their own political, cultural, and 
religious traditions, while incorporating cultural traditions imported from 
China and Japan. 12 
6. Wmter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
7. GEORGE H . KERR, OKINAWA, THE HISTORY OF AN ISLAND PEOPLE 3 (Tuttle Publ'g 
2000). Kerr's text was first published in 1958, id, at the request of the island's U.S. military civil 
administrator and may reflect U.S. policy bias as a result, but it is a seminal detailed history. 
8. Okinawa Infonnation, K.ADENAAIRBASE (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.kadena.af.miU 
library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7287. The island is 67 miles long and can be as little as two 
miles and as large as seventeen miles wide. Jd 
9. ld It is closer to Manila, Taipei, Shanghai, and Seoul than Tokyo. Minority Rights 
Grp. lnt'l, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples- Japan: Ryukyuans 
(Okinawans), REFWORLD (2008), http://www.refworld.org/type,countryrep,mrgijpn,49749cfdc,O. 
htrnl. 
10. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supra note 9. 
11. Okinawa s Population Estimated To Exceed 1.4 Million, RYuK.YU SHIMPO (Aug. 31, 
2011 ), http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/20 11/09/09/2816/. 
12. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supra note 9. These languages are considered part of the 
Japonic language family, which also includes Japanese, while the Japanese consider these 
languages dialects. ld 
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The Okinawan people have a long history of delicately balancing 
their position between China and Japan, and eventually the United 
States. 13 In 1372, the Okinawa kingdom peacefully accepted China's 
supremacy, which practically meant that it had a formal trading 
relationship with the Chinese empire and paid it tribute.14 Japan became 
increasingly interested in Okinawa and was making its own demands on 
Okinawa for tribute by 1480.u 
The restoration of imperial authority in Japan and Japan's 
emergence as a world power in the nineteenth century resulted in part 
from Western powers opening up trade and concessions in China and 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In the midst of this period came the United 
States' Commodore Matthew Perry and his war ships, which stopped at 
Okinawa.16 Meanwhile, Okinawa continued to pay tribute to China, and 
Okinawa's king secretly asked for China's help to ward off Japan.17 
Technically, Okinawa remained a separate kingdom until the 
Japanese annexed the Ryukyu Islands in 1879, deposed the king, and 
took over administrative responsibilities.18 With Japanese annexation, 
Okinawans found themselves perceived as a distinct minority in a larger 
country and discriminated against officially-through the banning of 
their language-and other less official methods: 19 "From this point on, 
the treatment of the RyiikyUans is one which many indigenous peoples 
around the world are familiar with: loss of traditional forms of 
government and control over land and resources, as well as steps to 
supplant their distinct cultural and spiritual beliefs."20 
Japan's assertion of its "mythical homogeneity'' exacerbated the 
problem, as Okinawans were already perceived as being "strange" .and 
13. KERR, supm note 7, at 3. Prior to the frrst brief American occupation of Okinawa in 
1854 by Commodore Matthew Perry, it was a community "maintained without arms through a 
period of 450 years, a nation of courteous officials, farmers, fishermen, and traders." Jd 
14. Jd at 66. While generally Okinawa was a peaceful nation, there is a history on tpe 
island of competing kingdoms engaged in intrigue and succession conflicts. Okinawa was fmally 
unified in 1429. Jd at 15, 86. 
15. Jd at 140. Japan did successfully invade in 1609 and exercise effective economic 
control thereafter, though the Chinese did their best to maintain their influence with the elite. See 
id at 158, 166. 
16. Jd at 354. 
17. Id at 370. 
18. Id at 10. Japan "peacefully," though with a garrison of troops ready, abolished the 
kingdom, in part to preempt an expected visit by former U.S. President Ulysses Grant (who was 
feared to be interested in helping the Okinawans). Id at 382-83,387. 
19. Steve Rabson, Being Okinawan in Japan: The Diaspom Experience, AsiA-PAC. J.: 
JAPAN Focus (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Steve-Rabson/3720 ("At that time 
signs excluding Korean and Okinawan workers were everywhere in Osaka." (citation omitted)). 
20. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supmnote 9. 
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"wrong."2 ' Japan denies any notion that there is a separate Okinawan 
ethnicity that is subject to discrimination.22 
The great catastrophe for Okinawa was the. Japanese military 
mobilization and occupation in World War II. Okinawa formed the outer 
defense line for Japan.23 Local people "were forced to suffer great 
privation in yielding their meager stores to the occupying forces."24 
Okinawa's geography led to the horrific battle for Okinawa; it was 
part of the United States' island-skipping strategy to bring the war to 
mainland Japan. In eighty-two days, 12,000 American servicemen, 
90,000 Japanese military men, and 62,000 Okinawans died.25 
While Okinawans had some awareness of a growing danger, "[t]o 
the very last the government refused to disclose the gravity of Japan's 
war position or to alert the public to the inuninence of disaster."26 
According to the Congressional Research Service, "Many Okinawans 
remember this battle as a dark episode in a long history of the Japanese 
central government sacrificing Okinawa for the good of the mainland."27 
Okinawans directly connect Japan's annexation and discrimination 
with the U.S. military bases in Okinawa. 28 As stated by the 
Congressional Research Service analysts: "The attitudes of native 
Okinawans toward U.S. military bases are generally characterized as 
negative, reflecting a tumultuous history and complex relationships with 
'mainland' Japan and with the United States."29 
21. Rabson, supmnote 19. 
22. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supmnote 9. 
23. KERR, supm note 7, at 463. The Japanese military built airfields, and "three full 
divisions of Japanese soldiers (more than the total local population) were quartered there at the 
war's end." Id 
24. ld 
25. Id at 5 ("[T)he great majority were civilians caught helplessly between opposing 
armies."). The Congressional Research Service suggests the deaths of civilians may have been 
much higher, in the 40,000-100,000 range. EMMA CHANLEIT-AVERY & IAN E. RINEHART, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV, R42645, THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA AND THE FlJTENMA BASE 
CONTROVERSY 3 (2012) (citing SABURO IENAGA, THE PACIFIC WAR, 1931-1945, at 185 (Random 
House, Inc., 1978)). 
26. KERR, supmnote 7, at466. 
27. CHANLEIT-AVERY & RINEHART, supm note 25, at 4. 
28. Minority Rights Grp. Int'l, supm note 9 ("At present, the United States' military 
presence and the discriminatory policies of the Japanese government that facilitate the US 
military occupation of the islands dominate the time and energy of most politically active groups 
in Okinawa."). 
29. CHANLEIT-AVERY & RINEHART, supmnote 25, at 3. 
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III. U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION AND REVERSION 
The post-war history and status of U.S. forces in Okinawa are 
critical elements in determining the application of U.S. environmental 
laws to the U.S. military base siting in Okinawa. After World War II, the 
U.S. military occupied Okinawa as enemy territory (captured at great 
cost) and wanted to retain control.10 The war left the Okinawan society 
and its infrastructure destroyed.31 The U.S. military took over the existing 
Japanese military bases and built many more, sometimes by seizing the 
land.32 
After years of indecision within the U.S. government about how to 
preserve its control over Okinawa, the United States signed a peace treaty 
with Japan in 1951, which determined Okinawa's future.33 In article 3 of 
the treaty, the United States established its total control over Okinawa, 
though technically Japan retained title, so Okinawa would not be legally 
considered a colony or U.S. territory: · "[T]he United States will have the 
right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and 
jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including 
their territorial waters."34 The United States proceeded to rule Okinawa, 
in most respects, like a colony.35 
The United States strengthened its military hold on Okinawa while 
bringing investment and aid, producing a fast-growing economy! 6 This 
base-dependent economy, however, also created dysfunctions in 
Okinawan society. Bases physically displaced agricultural land and 
absorbed agriculturallaborers.37 Okinawan base communities developed 
catering to military personnel, causing significant damage to Okinawan 
30. NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES, KEYSTONE, THE AMERICAN OcCUPATION OF OKINAWA 
AND U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS 22 (2000); sec United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145, 
148 (D. Haw. 1954) ("The United States has ... acquired, and still retains, what may be termed a 
'de facto sovereignty' [over Okinawa]." (quoting Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 608 (9th 
Cir. 1951) (alteration in original))). 
31. SARANTAKES. supra note 30, at 31 . 
32. CHANLEIT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 4 ("The United States paid locals for 
the acquired land, but in some cases this purchase reportedly involved deception or outright 
coercion using bulldozers and bayonets to evict unwilling residents."). 
33. SecTreaty ofPeace, U.S.-Japan, art. 14, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169. 
34. Id art. 3; sec Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. at 148 (citing San Francisco Conference on 
Japanese Peace Treaty: Statement by John Foster Fulles, 25 DEP'T ST. BULL. 447, 452-59 
(1951)); KERR, supra note 7, at 7. 
35. SARANTAKES, supra note 30, at 61 . 
36. Sec id (citing U.S. OFFICE OF TilE FED. REGISTER, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATE..<;: DwiGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1960-61 ~ 198, at 513 (2005)); Text of 
Eisenhower's Report to the Nation on Far East Trip, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1960, at 4). 
37. SARANTAKES, supra note 30, at 69. 
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women. 
38 
"An air force analysis estimated that 90 percent of all the bars 
catering to Americans were fronts for organized prostitution." 39 
Okinawan sources report a survey conducted in 1969 finding that 7,400 
women worked in the sex industry.40- • 
Meanwhile, U.S. military and civilian administrators ruled Okinawa. 
Slowly, Okinawa was given the ability to elect local and regional officials. 
Okinawans were becoming a force of their own with frequent massive 
protests, including antiwar protests, as the United States became 
embroiled in Vietnam.41 
Eventually, the saga of diplomatic and political machinations in the 
United States and Japan over what to do about Okinawa culminated in 
1971 when Japan and the United States adopted a 1972 treaty reverting 
administrative control to the Japanese.42 Articles II and ill of the treaty 
assured that Okinawa was subject to the security treaties and agreements 
previously signed in 1960 and 1953 allowing continued U.S. base 
operations. The 1960 security treaty provided, "[T]he United States of 
America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities 
and areas in Japan.'>43 The 1960 Status of Forces Agreement stated, 
"Within the facilities and areas, the United States may take all the 
measures necessary for their establishment, operation, safeguarding and 
control.'>44 
At the time of reversion, the Japanese legislature separately passed a 
resolution calling for base reduction in Okinawa.45 However, the U.S. 
bases · remained, and only slowly has the United States reduced its 
presence. "The main island of Okinawa comprises 0.6% of Japan's land 
area and is smaller than Long Island, yet it hosts 74% of the [U.S.] 
38. In 1974, the author personally observed run-down communities adjacent to the bases, 
typical of what one would fmd in third-world communities impacted by the U.S. military, with 
cheesy disco clubs, cheap restaurants and women soliciting. 
39. SARANTAKES, supmnote 30, at 73. 
40. Suzuyo Takazato, Violence Against Women Under Long-Tenn US. Military Station 
in Okinawa, JCA-NET 11-12, http://www.jca.apc.org/wsf_support/2004doc/WSFJapUSBaseRepo 
Fina!All.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2014 ). 
41. SARANTAKES, supmnote 30, at 195. One protest resulted in the cessation ofbombing 
runs from the Kadena Air Force Base during the Vietnam War. Jd 
42. Sec Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, at 
564, June 17, 1971,23 U.S.T. 446; scca/soSARANTAKES, supmnote 30, ch. 29. 
43. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, art. VI, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 
U.S.T. 1632. 
44. Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-
lapan, art. ill, para. 1, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652 [hereinafter 1960 Status of Force 
Agreement]. 
45. SARANTAKES, supm note 30, at I 92. 
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military bases in Japan."46 About half of the 38,000 U.S. military 
personnel stationed in Japan are in Okinawa.47 As recently as 2012, there 
were an additional 50,000 U.S. residents.'8 
The Okinawans now find themselves balancing being· a minority in 
Japan while continuing to be subject to the legacy of occupation by a 
superpower, the United States. These dynamics of Okinawan life are 
fueling the controversy and opposition to the MCAS Futenma relocation. 
IV. THE MCAS FUTENMA RELOCATION CONFLICT 
A. Background 
After a particularly heinous rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl 
in 1995, Japanese and U.S. authorities, operating as the bilateral Security 
Consultative Committee (SCC) (created under the nations' security 
treaty), formed a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) with 
the purpose of reducing the burden of the United States' presence on 
Okinawa.49 The SEC recommended twenty-six initiatives, including the 
relocation of the MCAS Futenma off Okinawa's east coast and the return 
of the original base's land to Okinawa once replacement facilities were 
constructed. In 1996, SACO created the Futenma Implementation 
Group (FIG) to develop these plans.50 
The MCAS Futenma is currently located in Ginowan City. As often -
happens with U.S. overseas military bases, social and economic 
conditions led to an influx of urban development to the point that the city 
now surrounds the base.51 Japanese officials, driven by objections from 
Okinawans concerned with their safety (fears of aircraft crashes were 
con!mned in 2004) and tired of the noise, pollution, and crime, called for 
46. Japan Culture NYC, Nago Mayor Says US Bases ':<l Legacy of Misery" in Okinawa, 
RocKET NEWS 24 (May 24, 2014), http://en.rocketnews24.com/2014/05/24/nago-mayor-says-us-
bases-a-1egacy-of-misery-in-okinawal. 
47. CHANLETI-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 8. 
48. Okinawalnfonnation, supranote 8. 
49. Sangwon Yoon, Okinawa Mayor lnvo./res Sea Cow Deaths To Stop US. Base, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 21, 2014), http://B1oomberg.com/news/2014-05-21/0kinawa-mayor-
invokes-sea-cow-deaths-to-stop-u-s-base.htm1; see Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 
1082, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
50. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2005) (discussing The SACO Final Report on Futenma Ali' Station, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN § I.e (Dec. 2, 1996), http://www.mofa.go.jp/regionln-americaluslsecurity/96 
saco2.html). 
51. Yoshio Shimoji, The Futenma Base and the US. -Japan Controversy: An Okinawan 
Perspective, AsiA-PAC. J.: JAPAN Focus (May 3, 2010), http://www.japanfocus.org/site/make__pdfl 
3354. 
62 TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 28:1 
the closure of the base and its relocation. 52 U.S. authorities saw the value 
in removing its air activities to a less-congested area. 
However, in December 1996, the SCC members approved replacing 
the MCAS Futenrna with an offshore sea-based facility (SBF) 
somewhere off the east coast of Okinawa. The SCC created FIG, a 
bilateral Japan-U.S. committee under the SCC's supervision, to 
implement the plan. 53 The United States Department of Defense (DOD) 
funded FIG at around $4 million a year.54 In 1997, while the Japanese 
government was charged with selecting the specific site, the DOD 
provided the specific parameters for the new base. Pursuant to those 
requirements, the governor of Okinawa designated the precise SBF site 
in 1999- an area in Henoko Bay that would become a landfill, adjacent 
to Camp Schwab, located next to a town in the North called Nago.55 
Nago has been described as "a tourist town with beautiful beaches 
and a pineapple park. Its waters are home to gorgeous coral and seagrass 
beds."56 Part of the municipality is a fishing hamlet known as Henoko.57 
During the Vietnam War, 150 to 200 "G .1. bars" operated in the 
"entertainment" area of Henoko, ''with many also functioning as second-
floor brothels."58 More recently, only sixteen bars remain, and Henoko 
has been described as a sleepy hamlet, with its residents engaged partly 
with agriculture and fishing but mainly subsisting on income from the 
base through land rentals and employment, construction projects, and 
small family stores. 59 
52. Martin Fackler, In a City on Okinawa, Mayor's Re-Election Deals a Blow to Marine 
B&·e Relocation Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A6. 
53. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 2 (discussing The SACO Final Report on 
Futenma Air Station, supra note 50, § I.e). 
54. ld at 3 (citing DEP'T OF THE NAVY, FYI999 AMENDED BUDGET ESTIMATES: 
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES 16 (1998)). 
55. Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://globalsecurity. 
org/military/facilitylhenoko.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). Targeting the bay next to Camp 
Schwab could not have been much of a surprise, given the Marine Corps' prior efforts to expand 
into the bay. Jd In 1962, the military had a plan to build a military port and actually began 
blasting and drilling in the waters to expand the bay. Steve Rabso;n, Henoko and the US. 
Military: A History of Dependence and Resistance, AsiA-PAC. J.: JAPAN Focus (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://wwwjapanfocus.org/sitelmake_pdf73680. Protests by local fishermen warded off that idea. 
Id 
56. Japan Culture NYC, supra note 46. 
57. Fackler, supra note 52, at A6. 
58. Rabson, supra note 55 ("Aside from admonitions by chaplains, the military did little 
to discourage the widespread patronage of prostitutes. In fact, official policies had the effect of 
encouraging it."). 
59. /d (citation omitted). 
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Nearby, there is still an unspoiled coastline.w The landfill would 
likely destroy the area's coral reef and potentially damage nearby habitat, 
including the few remaining seagrass beds in the area. lpese seagrass 
beds are fed on by the endangered Okinawa dugong, a cousin of the U.S. 
manatee. The Okinawa dugong is isolated and genetically distinct, with 
only 50 of them still surviving off Okinawa's coast.61 
The Okinawa dugong is quite a symbol for U.S. insensitivity to 
Okinawans. It is associated with Okinawa's creation mythology, folklore, 
and rituals of traditional Okinawan culture.62 Its main predators are 
humans. 63 The Japan Ministry of the Environment has listed it as 
endangered and as a protected "natural monument" on the Japanese 
Register of Historic Places, Places of Scenic Beauty and/or Natural 
Monuments under its "Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties.'.o.l 
Nago actually held a referendum on whether to support the 
relocation in 1997. A majority of the residents voted against the 
proposae5 However, the national government used its financial and 
political resources to change the mind of local officials, including a 
succession of town mayors.66 Local construction, bars, and restaurant 
businesses looked forward to the economic benefits of a larger base. 
Nevertheless, in 1998, 78% of Henoko residents signed a petition 
circulated by an antibase organization opposing the base.67 
Given these economic incentives and political pressures, the then 
current Nago mayor accepted the site location in 1999, a month after the 
60. Yoon, supra note 49. 
61. See John Roach, Rare Japanese Dugong Threatened by US. Military Base, NAT'L 
GEOGRAPlllC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2007), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/newslpf761 082026.html. 
The Okinawa dugong is related to Southeast Asia's dugongs, which can be found from Japan to 
Australia. ld 
62. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2005) (citing Declaration of Isshu Maeda in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss at 2-6, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP [hereinafter Declaration of Isshu 
Maeda]). 
63. Roach, supra note 61. 
64. Dugong, No. C 03-4350, slip op. at 5 (quoting Declaration of Masayuki Yonaha in 
Support of Defendant's Motion To Dismiss at 3, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP). 
65. Miyume Tanji, Report, US. Court Rules in the "Okinawa Dugong" Case, 
Implications for US. Military Bases Overseas, 40 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 475. 476 (2008); see 
also CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 10 (citing WILLIAM L. BROOKS, AsiA· 
PACIFIC POLICY PAPERS SERIES No. 9, THE POLITICS OF FUTENMA BASE ISSUE IN OKINAWA: 
RELOCATION NEOOI1ATIONS IN 1995-1997, 2005-2006, at 20 (20 1 0) ). 
66. Tanji, supra note 65, at 476. A 07 summit costing 1.3 billion yen was held in Nago. 
A "Northern Districts Development Fund" was funded with I 00 million yen. Jd 
67. Rabson, supra note 55 (citation omitted). 
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governor signed off on ie8 In August 2000, a "Consultative Body of 
Futenma Relocation" was established to provide a specific plan for the 
relocation.69 The body included local and national officials. In 2002, it 
approved the decision to relocate the Marine Air Statton and its assets to 
the Henoko district (offshore from the Marines' Camp Schwab).70 
The United States and Japan made additional changes to the design, 
agreeing jn 2006 on a V-shaped runway partially built on a landfill that 
extends into the bay. 71 But by then, Okinawans and the U.S. 
environmental groups had joined together to stop the base. 
B Okinawan Activists and US. Environmentalists Successfiilly Sue in 
Federal Court Under the·NHPA 
A coalition of Okinawan and Japanese environmental peace groups 
and activists, along with a U.S. environmental organization represented 
by U.S.-based Earthjustice, came together behind a U.S. legal strategy to 
stop the Futenma relocation to the Okinawa coast.72 The complaint, filed 
in 2003, initially entitled Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld,13 focused upon 
the DOD's failure to carry out the requirements of the NHPA. 74 
Specifically, the complaint ·charged that in locating the new site in 
dugong habitat, the DOD failed to consider the impacts of the base 
relocation upon the Okinawa dugong.75 
Congress enacted the NHPA to preserve "the prehistoric and 
historic resources of the United States and of the international 
68. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 3 (citing Declaration of John D. Hill in 
Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss at 3, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP). 
69. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085 (N.D. Cal'. 2008) (citing 
Motion for Summary Judgment ex. 15, art. xxv, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 03-4350 
MHP)). 
70. Id (citing Motion for Summary Judgment ex. 13, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 
03-4350 MHP)). 
71. ./d at 1086 (citing Motion for Summary Judgment ex. 19, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 
1082 (No. C 03-4350 MHP)). Each runway would be 1,600 meters in length plus 200 meters as 
"overrun" areas. Id 
72. Id at 1083. The complaint also lists the Okinawa Dugong as one of the plaintiffs, 
hence the name of the case, but the court dismissed it as a plaintiff per Ninth Circuit precedent 
that the APA only allows suits by persons. Id at 1093 (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 
1169 (9th Cir. 2004)). The plaintiffs were the Center for Biological Diversity, Thrtle Island 
Restoration Network, Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation, Save the Dugong Foundation, 
Dugong Network Okinawa, Committee Against Heliport Construction, Save Life Society, Anna 
Koshiishi, Takurna Higashionna, and Yoshikazu Makishi. Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 1, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP. 
73. See Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 1. 
74. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2012). 
75. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 72, at 2. 
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community of nations." 76 While originally directed towards federal 
actions within the United States, a more recent amendment, section 402 
of the NHPH, applies to any federal undertaking of an action outside the 
United States that "may directly and adversely affect a property ... on 
the World Heritage List or on the applicable country's equivalent of the 
National Register.'m If a property is so affected, the federal agency 
carrying out the action must take into account "the effect of the 
undertaking on such property for purposes of avoiding or mitigating any 
adverse effects.''78 
The DOD first attacked the complaint on statutory grounds, 
questioning whether "historical preservation" applied to a living animal. 79 
The statute's section explicitly allowing extraterritoriality refers to actions 
affecting "a property.'.so The judge, Marilyn Hall Patel, determined that 
the animal was indeed "property," as that term is used in the statute, 
because it was listed under Japan's equivalent of our National Register; 
therefore, Judge Patel determined that it was entitled to protection under 
theNHPA.81 
As the court explained, the OlQnawa dugong is listed as a "natural 
monument" under Japan's "Cultural Resources Protection Law" and the 
NHPA is explicit in its extraterritoriality to assure United States 
compliance with the Convention Concerning the Protection of the Worid 
Cultural and Natural Heritage. 82 The court recognized that the 
Convention, and the NHPA's corresponding amendments intended to 
come under the Convention, appreciated that cultures vary, so inevitably, 
what each country lists as culturally important will vary.83 As the court 
put it, "To require identical definitions of culture would eviscerate 
section 470a-2's explicit recognition of 'equivalent' foreign lists.''84 • That 
76. 
77. 
78. 
16 u.s.c. § 470-l(b)(2). 
Id § 470a-2. 
Id 
79. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 
2005). 
80. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2. 
81. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 12 (mentioning 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). While 
this decision has received some commentary questioning its validity, the court's analysis is a good 
example how a U.S. law can be artfully applied extraterritorially without interfering with foreign 
policy or military necessity. See Lauren Jensen Schoenbaum, The Okinllwa Dugong and the 
Creative Application of US. Extraterritorial Environmental Law, 44 TEX.INT'L L.J. 457, 471-73 
(2009). 
82. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 17. 
83. ld at 10-11 (citing Declaration of Thomas F. King, Ph.D. in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion To Dismiss at 21, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP [hereinafter 
Declaration ofThomas F. King]). 
84. Id at 11. 
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is, Congress, by explicitly requiring deference to another nation's list of 
protected cultural properties, was accepting that what another country 
considers to be culturally important may be different than what the 
United States considers to be culturally important. · 
The court further noted that practically, the approaches by Japan 
and the United States to what is a culturally significant property resulted 
in the same bottom line protection. Japan's listing of the Okinawan 
dugong under its monument law was recognition of its historical and 
cultural significance.85 The United States had listed locations because of 
their role as habitat for historically important animals.86 The fact that 
Japan chose to list the actual animal was not deemed a significant 
difference. 87 
The court then examined whether this approach was consistent with 
the NHPA's specific definition of "property," which includes the word 
"object." "Object" is defined by the applicable regulations as "a material 
thing of functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical or scientific value that 
may be, by nature or design, movable yet related to a specific setting or 
environment."88 With this definition, the court then had no trouble 
finding that the Okinawa dugong is a "material thing" that has 
"functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical or scientific value" and, in 
particular, a special cultural significance in Okinawa.89 
Applying this regulatory defmition of "object," Judge Patel cited 
uncontroverted evidence that in Okinawan creation mythology, the 
Okinawa dugong is considered the ancestor of human beings. In 
traditional Okinawan folklore, ''the dugong is revered as a 'female 
. mermaid spirit,' worshiped at special shrines as a deity responsible for 
successful fishing expeditions, and feared as an 'ocean spirit' capable of 
creating tsunamis." 90 Other evidence described how shamans and 
Henoko Bay residents sang songs about the Okinawa dugongs. 9 1 
Therefore, the court found that the Okinawa dugong is "movable yet 
related to a specific setting or environment," that is, Henoko Bay, and, 
85. ld at 12 (citing Declaration oflsshu Maeda, supra note 62, at 2-6). 
86. ld at 11 (citing Declaration of Thomas F. King, supra note 83, at 8-9, 16-17). 
87. Id (citing Declaration ofThomas F. King, supra note 83, at 9). 
88. National Register of Historic Places, 36 C.F.R. § 60.30).(2013). 
89. Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 14 (quoting Declaration of Isshu Maeda, 
supra note 62, at 2-1 0). 
90. ld (citing Declaration oflsshu Maeda, supra note 62, at 3, 9). 
91. ld (citing Declaration of Isshu Maeda, supra note 62, at 1 0). 
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ultimately, that it is an object deserving of consideration under the 
NHPA.92 
Based upon the above-described analysis, the ~o}lrt found the 
Okinawan dugong to be a protected property under the NHPA.93 The 
court then had to detennine whether the U.S. military in its activities 
prior to 2005 had undertaken an action that threatened the Okinawan 
dugong. The DOD tried to claim that the project was really being carried 
out solely by the Japanese and was barred by the Act of State Doctrine.94 
The court rejected the argument: 
It would amount to a legal absurdity for this court to hold that, as a matter 
of law, a facility constructed on behalf of and for the use of the United 
States is not a federal undertaking, given the statute's explicit inclusion of 
any ''project, activity, or program ... carried out by or on behalf of the 
agency.95 
Judge Patel's decision is noteworthy for its sensitivity to Okinawan 
culture and Japanese laws in interpreting a congressional mandate that 
federal agencies respect international cultural resources. In that respect, 
it applied a concept of the environmental justice doctrine, which 
"demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for 
all peoples" and provides a key for how U.S. courts and the military 
should be required to proceed in the future. 96 
However, even with this initial decision, the court noted that . 
questions still remaine<\ as to whether the United States was in fact 
continuing to undertake the project, its potential impact to the Okinawan 
dugong, and whether the United States had properly consulted and 
considered the fate of the species.97 These questions are central to 
whether the court would be able to continue to assure U.S. military 
compliance with the NHPA without compromising military necessity or 
foreign policy. 
Three years later, in 2008, Judge Patel again reviewed the DOD 
compliance in Okinawa Dugong v. Gates8 and had the opportunity to 
focus upon what the project may mean for the Okinawa dugong. Once 
again, the DOD argued that this was really a project by the Japanese and 
92. Jd (quoting Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion To Dismiss ex. 3, at 129-30, Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP). 
93. ld at 17 (mentioning National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). 
94. Id at28. 
95. Id at 23 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7)). 
96. The Principles of Environmental Justice (EJ), supra note 2. 
97 . Dugong, No. C 03-4350 MHP, slip op. at 22,26 (mentioning 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). 
98 . 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (mentioning 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). 
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the court was imprudently meddling in a foreign country's affairs.99 The 
court, after reviewing additional discovery, nevertheless found that the 
DOD had undertaken the project and that its actions could be reviewed 
without interfering with a foreign government: · 
[T]he United States has been substantially involved in the design and site 
selectiop. for the FRF, will continue to monitor and oversee the construction 
of the facility to ensure that it meets U.S. requirements, and will have 
exclusive authority to operate the facility once it is completed . . . . This 
court's review is directed solely at [the] DOD's compliance with the 
NHPA.lOO 
As to the impacts on the Okinawa dugong, the NHPA does not 
require a showing that undertaking a project will actually destroy a 
"property" before fmding a violation. According to the court, all that is 
needed is a showing that an adverse effect "may" impact, either "directly 
or indirectly, any of the characteristics" of a property and that these 
impacts were not properly considered.101 
The court easily found that the proposed military facility operating 
in or near a bay with Okinawa dugong feeding grounds (and where they 
have been observed) would potentially cause adverse impacts.102 The 
impacts ranged from destruction of the Okinawa dugong due to 
contamination of the seagrass to collisions with boats, "as well as long-
term immune and reproductive damage resulting from exposure to 'toxins 
and acoustic pollution."103 The court, based upon the NHPA's explicit 
requirements and legislative history, ruled that the DOD had to generate 
and consider information on how the project would affect the Okinawa 
dugong, develop alternatives or mitigations if necessary, c;:onsult with 
Japan, and do it all before approving the activity.104 
It is astonishing that, according to the court, the _DOD only 
superficially considered the Okinawa dugong, even after the case was 
filed in 2003.10' The DOD claimed it had inadequate information and 
that there was better seagrass in other locations, and therefore, it could 
99. Id at 1097-98 (quoting Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 24, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 03-4350 MHP)). 
100. Id at 1098-99. 
101. Id at 1101-02 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(l)). 
102. Id at 1102. 
103. Id 
104. Id at 1108 (quoting National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). 
105. Id (''The current record contains no evidence that a single official from the DOD 
with responsibility for the FRF has considered or assessed the available information on the 
dugong or the effects of the FRF."). 
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wait for the Japanese who would do their own analysis.106 However, the' 
court placed the responsibility for compliance with the NHPA squarely 
upon the DOD and required that if it did not have the information, it 
needed to get it, study it, and recommend appropriate· mitigation. 107 
Further, all of this analysis needed to proceed and be concluded well 
before the eve of construction and before there was an irretrievable 
allocation of resources.108 
Particularly revealing of the DOD's approach was a DOD document 
admitting that the base would cause environmental impacts and 
suggesting that the Japanese just needed to exercise political will over the 
''use" of these arguments. 109 Judge Patel nailed the implications of this 
statement squarely in her opinion: 
Insofar as these statements suggest that DOD need not concern itself with 
environmental impacts because they are unavoidable and are simply an 
expedient used by opponents to obstru~;:t the FRF, these statements evince 
at best, plain ignorance of, and at worst, complete defiance of DOD's 
obligation to consider the impacts of the FRF on the dugong. The court is 
unconvinced that DOD has expressed concern for, let alone taken steps to 
consider the effects of the FRF on the dugong.110 
The decision in Gates is a model for how environmental laws can be 
applied extraterritorially without interfering with foreign policy, as 
further discussed in Parts V and VI below. However, while dealing a 
temporary blow to the base's relocation, Japan and the DOD continued to 
press ahead. 
C. The US. Military and Japanese National Government Strike Back 
In August 2009, the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), swept into power with its leader and then prime minister, 
Hatoyama Yuk:io, promising to relocate the MCAS Futenma outside of 
Okinawa.111 In 2010, lnamine Susumu also campaigned for Mayor of 
Nago, opposing the base in Henoko, and won.112 
106. Sec id at 1109-10 (quoting Declaration of Stephen Getlein in Support ofDefendants' 
Motion To Dismiss at 3-4, Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (No. C 03-4350 MHP)). 
107. Id at 1111. 
108. Id at 1112 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2). 
109. ld at 1108 ("[T]he environmental issues are primarily a question of political will 
since any option will affect the environment and opponents will use environment-based 
arguments to advance their cause." (citation omitted)). 
110. Id 
111. Rabson, supmnote 55. 
112. Id 
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But in May 2010, Hatoyama broke his promise. He claimed that he 
had changed his mind about the need for the base for deterrence, though 
later, after he resigned, he claimed that was a rationalization.113 The U.S. 
military and Japan renewed their agreement to build 'the MCAS Futenma 
off of Henoko. By December 2013, the governor of Okinawa, with full 
and unqualified U.S. support, reportedly approved the project11 4 after 
there were "sweeteners" added. 11 5 
Already, Okinawans have filed a lawsuit to stop the project in 
Okinawa, and the Gates suit has been revived in San Francisco in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
addressing the DOD's failure to properly analyze project impacts and 
consult with the public.116 The mayor of Nago was as resistant as ever, 
promising to block construction permits117 and telling a crowd in New 
York City in May 2014: 
[W]e believe that in 69 years after the war, we have suffered enough under 
the presence of the US military bases. We have no more capacity to accept 
a new base on the island. And as a result, the anti-base movement has 
grown strong. Eighteen years later nothing has changed at Futenma 
airbase; it is still exactly the same. 118 
V. EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF NEP A AND THE ESA AS IT AFFECTS 
OKINAWA 
While the court's opinions in the Dugong and Gates opinions were 
well supported, it is striking how limited the decisions are. A battle over 
a significant U.S. base siting in prime habitat for an endangered species, 
filling in a bay, and affecting the social and economi<? life of a 
community dependent, at least in part on fishing, is narrowly being 
addressed under a U.S. law that requires consideration of the species only 
in terms of its cultural significance as a historical property. More apt in 
this situation would seem to be a law like NEPA, which requires a broad 
113. Id 
114. Erik Slavin, Chiyomi Sumida & Jon Harper, Okinawa Governor Signs Off on Long-
Delayed Futenma Relocation, STARS & STRIPES (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/news/ 
okinawa-govemor-signs-off-on-long-delayed-futenrna-re1ocation-1 .259407. 
115. Chiyomi Sumida, Okinawa Suit Fi1ed To Stop WoJt on New Camp Schwab Runway, 
STARS & STRIPES (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/okinawa-suit-filed-to-stop-work-
on-new-camp-schwab-runway-1.262085 (citing Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, Okinawa 
Rakes in Concession as Futenma Decision Looms, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www. 
stripes.corn/news/Okinawa-rakes-in-concessions-as-futenma-decision-1ooms-1.248432). 
116. First Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and ~unctive Relief at 3, Ctr. for 
Biological Diversityv. Hagel, No C-03-4350 (MHP) (N.D. Cal. filed July 31, 2014). 
117. Yoon, supmnote 49. 
118. Japan Culture NYC, supm note 46. 
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comprehensive analysis of environmental impacts, and the ESA, which 
requires actual protection of endangered animals. 11 9 
NEPA generally requires that each federal agency, when carrying 
out a major federal action120 significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment,121 must provide a detailed statement on all of the 
action's environmental impacts, 122 adverse environmental effects that 
cannot be avoided, and alternatives.121 The agency must also evaluate 
potential mitigation measures.124 If an agency fails to fully analyze or 
consider a project's potential impacts, a court may enjoin the project. 1 2 ~ 
NEPA, if applicable to the United States' Okinawa base siting, would be 
able to address its broad range of impacts, including social and economic 
impacts, to the extent that they relate to the environmental impacts.126 
The ESA's thrust is the conservation of endangered and threatened 
species. 127 It requires, with some notable exceptions, including so-called 
incidental takes, that each federal agency "insure that any action . . . is 
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse 
modification of habitat of such species." 128 The ESA specifically 
prohibits, though again with some exceptions, the harming or killing of 
any endangered species.129 
The Okinawa dugong is listed as protected under the ESA.no Thus, 
the application of NEPA and the ESA to the Okinawa base siting could 
have a profound impact on the DOD's decision making. As discussed 
below, the federal case law regarding U.S. environmental laws' 
extraterritoriality is somewhat inconsistent. However, an argument can 
119. . See Schoenbawn, supra note 81, at 462-66 (recommending that the United States use 
NEPA and the ESA to evaluate the impacts on the Okinawa dugong). 
120. "Action" may include policies, plans, programs, or projects. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b) 
(2013). 
121. Case law requires the analysis when substantial questions are raised as to whether a 
project may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor. Blue Mountains 
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F. 3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)). 
122. The statement is normally a fully comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS). 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4. 
123. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
124. 40C.F.R. § 1502.14(f). 
125. SeeBlueMountainsBiodiversityProjec~ 161,F.3dat 1216. 
126. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14; see Alan Ramo, Environmental Justice as an Essential Tool in 
Environmental Review Statutes: A New Look at Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections 
and Ca/ifomia s Recent Initiatives, 19 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & PoCv 41 , 48-52 (20 13 ). 
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(l) (2012). 
128. Jd § 1536(a)(2). 
129. Id § 1538(a)(l)(B). 
130. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)(2013). 
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be made that NEPA and the ESA do apply to the Okinawa base 
relocation. 
A. In Spite of Conflicting Case Lau-; NEPA and 'the ESA Should 
Apply to Washington-Based Environmental Decision Making 
Affecting Okinawa 
Federal court decisions addressing extraterritoriality of U.S. laws all 
claim to adhere to the basic presumption against the extraterritoriality of 
U.S. law: "It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation 
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 131 This 
presumption rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily le~slates 
with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters.132 "Thus, 'unless there is 
the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a 
statute extraterritorial effect, 'we must presume it is primarily concerned 
with domestic conditions."'133 
Yet when federal courts apply these seemingly straightforward 
principles, extraterritoriality analysis becomes quite complex and 
· inconsistent. For example, in 1993, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the presumption does not 
apply to NEPA in Environmental Defense f'und v. Massey. 134 The court 
found that NEPA did apply to a proposal to incinerate wastes in an open 
landfill at a U.S. research station in Antarctica. The court distinguished 
Antarctica as a "global common," analogous to outer space.135 The court 
noted that the Supreme Court had recently found that the primary 
purpose of the presumption is ''to protect against unintended clashes 
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord."136 The court then identified three situations when 
the presumption does not apply: ( 1) where Congress expresses its 
intention that it does apply, (2) where adverse effects will occur in the 
United States, and (3) where the conduct to be regulated occurs in the 
United States.137 
131. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Anunco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley 
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949)). 
132. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,204 n.5. (1993). 
133. Morrison v. Nat'] Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (quoting Anunco, 499 
U.S. at 248). 
134. 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
135. Id at 529 (citing Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
136. Anunco, 499 U.S. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,20-22 (1963)). 
137. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (quoting Anunco, 499 U.S. at 248). · 
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Focusing on the third exception, the court noted that NEPA 
regulates the decision-making conduct of administrative agencies that is 
normally carried out in the United States: "Because the decisionmaking 
process~s of federal agencies take place almost exclusively in this 
country and involve the workings of the United States government, they 
are uniquely do:r~estic."138 As a ·result, ''NEPA would never require 
enforcement in a foreign forum or involve 'choice of law' dilemmas."u9 
It was on this basis that the court held that the extraterritoriality 
preS1,1ITlption does not apply to NEPA.140 
Admittedly, the court found that ''Antarctica's unique status in the 
international arena further supports our conclusion that this case does not 
implicate the presumption against extraterritoriality."141 However, the 
court noted this distinction after already concluding that the presumption 
does not apply to NEPA decision making in the United States. The 
Massey court pinpointed the language ·in Aramco that states that the 
presumption applies only ''beyond places over which the United States 
has sovereignty or some measure of legislative contro1"'42 The Massey 
court cited with apptoval the D.C. Circuit's assumed approval ofNEPA's 
extraterritoriality in Sierra Club v. Adams, which involved a highway in 
Panama and Colombia with major federal funding. The court found no 
foreign policy interests or competing sovereign interests preventing the 
U.S. agency from applying NEPA to its Antarctica activities.143. 
Yet soon afterwards, a district court in the same circuit seemed to 
rule otherwise in NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin.144 In that case, 
plaintiffs sought environmental impact studies for certain U.S. military 
installations in Japan.14' The district court in the D.C. Circuit, relying 
upon the Supreme Court case Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 146 held that the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes limited 
NEPA's application to U.S. military bases in Japan.147 The court noted 
138. ld at 532 •(citing Mary A. MacDougall, Extraterritorislity and tht: Endangered 
SpeciesActof1973, 80 GEo.L.J. 435,445 (1991)). 
139. ld at 533. 
140. Jd 
141. Jd 
142. Jd (quoting Anunco, 499 U.S. at 248). 
143. Id (citing Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
144. 837 F. Supp. 466,468 (D.D.C. 1993). 
145. Id at 466-67. The brief memorandum opinion fails to delineate which bases were 
involved, but they appear to be related to Tokyo Bay on the mainland. See Thomas E. Digan, 
Comment, NEPA and the Presumption Against Extraterritorisl Application: The Foreign Policy 
Exclusion, 11 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTHL. &Pot:v 165, 167 n.l7 (1994)(citations omitted). 
146. 336 u.s. 281,285 (1949). 
147. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. at467. 
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that the U.S. bases were operated pursuant to a treaty and the 1960 Status 
of Forces Agreement. In these circumstances, the court found no 
evidence that Congress explicitly intended NEPA to apply internationally 
where there was a security relationship between the United States and a 
sovereign power. 148 The court distinguished Massey based upon 
Antarctica's different international status; however, it never fully 
addressed Masseys primary rationale that NEPA only regulates U.S. 
agency decision making that takes place within the United States. 
Later, in 2005, the D.C. district court in Basel Action Network v. 
Maritime Admim'stration held that NEPA does not apply to the high seas 
due to lack of "legislative control;' thereby distinguishing Massey. 149 The 
court questioned the continuing power of Massey. The court noted that a 
month after Massey, the Supreme Court in Smith v. United States applied 
the presumption against extraterritoriality to a federal statute's effect in 
Antarctica.15° Four months later in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 
the Supreme Court found that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
has "special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions 
that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has 
unique responsibility." 151 However, neither case cited Massey nor 
addressed Massey's third exception. 
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
ARC Ecology v. United States Department of the Air Force also 
confronted the issues of extraterritoriality when evaluating the 
application of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLAt2 to former U.S. bases in 
the Philippines.153 In that case, primarily Filipino citizens and two U.S. 
nonprofits petitioned under CERCLA to have the United States Air Force 
conduct a preliminary assessment of the former Clark Air Force Base 
and Subic Naval Bases' potential to release toxins into the environment. 
The court first held that the language of CERCLA does not indicate 
congressional intent to apply to foreign claimants, citing Sale and its 
specific language upholding a presumption against extraterritoriality 
involving military affairs.154 The Ninth Circuit case found that CERCLA 
148. ld at 468. 
149. 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 72 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 
204 n.5 (1993)). 
150. ld (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
151. 509 U.S. 155, 188 ( 1993) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 
304 (1936)). . 
152. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (2012). 
153. 411 F. 3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005). 
154. ARC Ecology, 411 F.3d at 1098 n.3 (citing Sale, 509 U.S. at 188). 
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did not apply because at the time of filing suit, the bases had been under 
the exclusive control of the Philippines government for ten years.155 The 
court also found a number of statutory clauses to be inconsistent with 
extraterritoriality, such as providing venue in the distriCt where the 
violation occurred.156 
Yet the ARC Ecology, Basel Action Network, and Aspin courts 
overlooked the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush, which 
found that no presumption of extraterritoriality applied to the U.S. base in 
Guantanamo, Cuba.157 The Court found that the habeas statute applied to 
those suspected terrorists detained in the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base 
because the United States exercises '"complete jurisdiction and 
control' . . . and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it 
so chooses."'58 
As discussed above in Part IV.B, in 2008, a district court in the 
Ninth Circuit in the Gates case found that the NHPA's text required 
extraterritoriality for the Okinawa base siting. Additionally, while 
looking at the same treaties and intergovernmental relationships between 
the United States and Japan reviewed in the Aspin case, the court found 
no foreign policy concerns interfering with court jurisdiction. The court 
noted, consistent with Massey, that it was only focused upon the DOD 
actions and obligations.159 
Applying these cases to Okinawa is not as straightforward as one 
would hope. Okinawa is not the Philippines, as occupation of its bases 
continues, nor is it Guantanamo, Cuba, as governance has technically 
reverted back to Japan. As detailed above in Part II, Okinawa is not just 
another part of mainland Japan. The original U.S.-Japan peace treaty, as 
discussed above in Part III, did give the United States "de.:facto 
sovereignty," as one federal court put it.'60 The subsequent U.S.-Japan 
security agreements gave the United States de facto authority over 
155. ld 
156. Jd at 1100 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b)(1); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 202-
03 ( 1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Anunco), 499 U.S. 244, 256 ( 1991 )). 
157. 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ). 
158. ld at 480 (quoting Agreement for the Lease (Subject to Terms To Be Agreed upon by 
the Two Governments) to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, 
.S.-Cuba, art. ITI, Feb. 16, 1903, T.S. No. 418). 
159. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F Supp. 2d 1082, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2008); sec also 
Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 908-09 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (following 
Massey and upholding the extraterritorial application of NEPA where the decision on a project 
significantly affecting the domestic environment is made within the United States and where the 
government agency may have control over the project's operation). 
160. United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Haw. 1954) (quoting Treaty 
ofPeace, supra note 33, art. 3). 
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Okinawa, similar to the situation in Guantanamo,'61 and as discussed 
above in Part ill, U.S. control over the base relocation in terms of funding 
and control is similar to the situation in Adams. 
The Supreme Court itself has not applied 'the presumption where 
the United States maintains sovereignty or "some measure of legislative 
control."162 As detailed in the Gates case, as discussed in Part IY.B, the 
DOD is effectively controlling the site relocation decision in Okinawa. 
In addition, the Massey court's focus on where the decisions are made, as 
described above, applies to the DOD's decision about the MCAS 
Futenma relocation. Key decisions were made at the very senior level of 
the U.S. government, including by then U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.163 
Further, this is a case where the federal district court already has 
. found that the NHPA can be applied to the base relocation without any 
interference with foreign policy or military affairs, thus distinguishing 
the Sale case. The Gates decision has not been appealed, and the U.S. 
military has proceeded, as discussed above in Part IV, to live with delay 
by further considering its decision along with Japan. If the application of 
the NHPA in Okinawa has not been problematical as to foreign policy or 
military affairs, the policy reasons relied upon by the Aspin court for 
applying the extraterritoriality presumption to NEPA appear to vanish. 
B. Even Under a Recent US. Supreme Court Decision Focusing the 
Presumption Against Extraterriton'ality on the Statutory Text, 
NEPA and the ESA Should Apply to the Okinawa Base Relocation 
Justice Scalia, with at least four other judges, attempted to constrain 
deeper analysis of the application of the presumption in his majority 
opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd 1~>~ He stated, "When 
a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none."
165 He argued that "divining what Congress would have wanted" as 
161. 1960 Status of Force Agreement, supra note 44. Japan is given more authority to 
secure service personnel who have committed off-base crimes, but in Cuba, no service personnel 
are allowed in Cuba proper. 
162. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco}, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley 
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); see John H. Knox, A Presumption Against 
Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J.lNT'L L. 351 (20 I 0). 
163. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (discussing Office of the Spokesman, Japan Roadmap 
for Realignment Implementation, U.S. FORCES JAPAN (May 1, 2006), http://www.usfj.rniVDocu 
ments/UnitedStates-JapanRoadmapforRealignmenthnplementation.pdt). 
164. 561 u.s. 247 (2010). 
165. /dat255. 
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to extraterritoriality is mere ''judicial-speculation-made-law" and made it 
clear that this applies in all cases. 66 • 
Although Justice Scalia seemed to be requiring explicit 
extraterritorial statutory language, he_ backed off, denyiiig that he was 
adopting a "clear statement rule" and allowing textual analysis beyond 
simply looking for the words "this law applies abroad."167 Further, Scalia 
seemed to endorse what many comment;ators are now calling the "focus" 
theory of the presumption. 168 That is, if the focus of congressional intent 
is on the activity that is the subject of the claim, then the presumption 
does not lie. In Aramco, the focus was on domestic employment.169 In . 
Mom'son, it was on domestic sales of securities. 170 With a NEPA 
violation, as discussed in Massey, the focus-as the Supreme Court has 
said many times-is agency d~cision making and its procedural 
requirements. 171 
NEPA has no "clear statement" that says it applies to U.S. agency 
projects abroad. However, Congress is quite specific, as noted by the 
Massey court discussed above in Part V.A, that NEPA is directed to the 
agency decision-making process, not its ultimate wisdom or impacts. 
NEPA's whole structure focuses upon U.S. agency decision making and 
the specific procedures involving the preparation of its environmental 
impact analysis, as discussed at the beginning of this Part. 172 
Further, Congress clearly had policy goals to protect the world's 
environment with NEPA. The 'statute speaks of "man's activity on the 
interrelations of all components of the natural environment," 173 
presumably referring to all people of the world. It speaks to the ~'critical 
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the 
overall welfare and development of man."174 • 
The statute also specifically includes the goals of assuring that all 
"Americans" are safe and that our "national heritage" is protected. 175 
166. ld at 261. 
167. Jd at 265 (quoting Ammco, 499 u.s. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
168. Eg., Erick D. Rigby, Think Locally, Act Globally: The Presumption Against 
Extraterritorial Application of American Statutes and§ 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Ac~ 50 
DUQ. L. REv. 859, 889 (2012)(referencing Monison,.561 U.S. at 247). · 
169. .Ammco, 499 U.S. at 255. 
170. Momson, 561 U.S. at 266. 
171. SeeVt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. CoWicil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
558 (1978) ("[NEPA] is to insure a fully informed and we11-considered decision."). 
172. See id (citing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Cha11enging Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 
289,319 (1975)). 
173. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)(2012). 
174. Id 
175. ld § 4331(2), (4). 
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Furthermore, the statute states that Congress recognizes that "each 
person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a 
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the 
environment." 176 • 
Moreover, NEPA explicitly references world impacts: 
[A ]11 agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . recognize the 
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where 
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate 
support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize 
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the 
quality of mankinds world environment 171 
Based upon the above-quoted section, Congress seems to be directing 
U.S. agencies in their NEPA decision making to have a global perspective 
consistent with U.S. foreign policy. That decision making is exactly what 
is at issue in Okinawa. 
Other tools of statutory construction suggest NEPA's extrater-
ritoriality. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an executive 
office entity charged under NEPA with coordinating and overseeing the 
nation's environmental policies, 178 issues the fundamental regulations 
implementing NEPA. 179 Pursuant to its authority, the CEQ's chairman 
issued a memorandum determining that NEPA's reference to the "human 
environment'' includes other nations. 8° Courts are to give the CEQ's 
interpretation substantial deference. 181 
Justice Scalia may have wanted to close the door on a deeper 
analysis of when the presumption applies. But with a statute like NEPA, 
the considerations identified by the Massey case might ~till apply, as 
discussed above, if they illuminate textual analysis in "context" when 
there is no clear statement as permitted by Morrison. 182 
176. /d§4331(c). 
177. ld § 4332(2)(F) (emphasis added). 
178. ld §§ 4342, 4344. 
179. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2013). 
180. Russell W. Peterson, Memorandum on the Application of the EIS Requirement to 
Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions (Sept. 24, 1976), National 
Environmental Policy Act, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (Dec. 1, 1977). 
181. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (citing Warm Spring Dam Task 
Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-10 (1974)). President Carter did issue Executive Order 
12114, further refining and restricting how agencies were to implement NEPA internationally; 
however, the Order is considered ineffective by many commentators and without legal authority. 
See Karen A. Klick, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of NEPAs EIS Requirement After 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 291 (1994). 
182. Morrison v. Nat'! Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S . 247, 265 (20 10) ("Assuredly context can 
be consulted as well. But whatever sources of statutory meaning one consults to give 'the most 
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The ESA brings an additional array of arguments to bear. Like 
NEPA, there is no explicit language regarding extraterritoriality. 
However, also like NEPA, the text reveals that Congress's ambitions had 
global implications. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit summarized the key language in its decision in Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Lujan.183 For example, "the United States has pledged itself as 
a sovereign state in the international community to conserve to the extent 
practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing 
extinction."184 In listing species to be protected under the ESA, to assure 
species conservation, the Secretary of the Interior is required to consider 
species protected by any other country and to inform that country if the 
species is to be listed. 13s Numerous species outside of the United States 
have been so designated. 186 
Pursuant to this language, the Secretary of Interior issued a final 
rule on January 4, 1978, requiring U.S. agencies to ensure that their 
activities and programs do not jeopardize endangered species in foreign 
countries, thus confirming its extraterritoriality.187 When a new secretary 
in 1983 tried to reverse course and eliminate extraterritoriality, the Eighth 
Circuit in Defenders ofWJldlifestruck it down for violating the statute. 188 
Although the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision, it 
dodged the issue of extraterritoriality. Instead, it reversed and dismissed 
the case with its famous holding on standing. 189 As a result, the 
extraterritoriality of the ESA "remains unsettled and academics have 
debated Lujan from various angles." 19° Current United States 
Department of the Interior regulations continue to limit the consultation 
requirement to federal actions "in the United States or upon the high 
seas."
191 However, no case law has challenged the Eighth Circuit's 
analysis in Defenders of Wildlife directly, and the court's statutory 
analysis still seems sound even in light of Mom'son. 
faithful reading' of the text . ... "(quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Anunco), 499 U.S. 244, 
280 (1991 )). 
183. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), revtion other grounds, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
184. Endangered Species Act ofl973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4)(2012). 
185. Jd § 1533(b)(I)(B)(i)-(ii), (b)(5)(B). 
186. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 119 (citing Defenders ofWildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1040 
(8th Cir. 1988)). 
187. Intemgency Coopemtion- Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 874, 875 
(Jan. 4, 1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 402). 
188. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 125. 
189. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 ( 1992). 
190. Rigby, supmnote 168, at 860 (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). 
191 . 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (2013). 
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C A Separate Line of Cases Sustaining the ESAs Authority Under 
the Commerce Clause Strengthens the ESAs Extraterritoriality 
An additional line of cases sustaining the ESA's authority under the 
Commerce Clause also supports rejecting the presumption's application 
to the ESA. Federal judges have repeatedly found that Congress 
recognized the importance of protecting biodiversity to assure the 
continuing and future "availability of a wide variety of species to 
interstate commerce."192 As the House Report accompanying the ESA 
put it, by pushing species towards extinction, ''we threaten their-and our 
own-genetic heritage. The value of this genetic heritage is, quite 
literally, incalculable."193 
Thus, what happens globally with endangered species does affect 
what happens locally, placing the impacts within our own border. 
Applying the ESA to U.S. projects taking place beyond our borders is, in 
that sense, not extraterritorial because the ultimate effects are local. 
Using an analogous approach, the Ninth Circuit applied CERCLA to a 
Canadian company whose release of hazardous substances eventually 
travelled to a river in the United States and threatened further 
contamination, finding no issue of extraterritoriality.194 
One might argue that the fate of· the Okinawa dugong, given its 
marginal numbers located in a distant shoreline, will never impact U.S. 
interstate commerce. The courts, however, consider biodiversity's 
potential future benefits in ESA analysis. 195 The Senate Report 
accompanying the ESA stated no animal could be said to be de minimis 
for purpose of biodiversity for if "a species is lost, its distinctive gene 
material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to ·mankind in 
improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or 
192. Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)); sec San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. 
Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 
1481 (9th Cir. 1996); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978))("The ESA protects 
the future and unanticipated interstate-commerce value of species."); see also GDF Realty Invs., 
Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[O]ur analysis of the interdependenccr of 
species compels the conclusion that regulated takes under [the] ESA do affect interstate 
commerce."); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
193. In re Delta Smelt Consol. Cases, 663 F. Supp. 2d 922, 941 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting 
H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4 (1973)) afftl, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
194. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006). 
195. Conservation Force v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 994 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat'l 
A.s:Y'~ of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052). Judge Wald in National A.s:Yn of Home Builders 
referred to a species' "option value," 130 F.3d at 1053, while Judge Henderson cited the 
"interconnectedness of species and ecosystem." ld at 1 059 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
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environmental contamination, is. also irretrievably lost."196 Further, the 
Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich, a decision upholding the regulation 
of locally grown marijuana,197 determined, "[W]hen 'a gene~al regulatory 
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character 
of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence."'198 
The Supreme Court and various circuits have held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality gives way when activities outside 
U.S. borders affect activities within U.S, borders. 199 Admittedly, the 
Supreme Court has now rejected the traditional "effects" test in 
Morrison. 200 However, as Justice Stevens pointed out and Scalia 
seemingly has concurred, what was once the effects test may still be 
relevant if Congress's intent, as shown through text and legislative 
documents, were to addr~ss those local effects.201 
In sum, Congress intended the ESA to address the loss of 
biodiversity by even one endangered species because those impacts could 
affect interstate commerce and the future health and survival of the 
American people. It sought to address those impacts by regulating the 
decisions of U.S. agencies that cause those impacts. U.S. law should 
therefore be applied to protect the Okinawa dugong. 
VI. RECONCILING EXTRATERRITORIALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 
AND JUDICIAL MILITARISM WITH OKINAWA 
As discussed above, there are considerable leg~l arguments for 
applying NEPA and the ESA to the Okinawa base relocation. NEPA and 
the ESA's extraterritoriality is bolstered by the nation's commitment over 
the past twenty years to the principles of environmental justice. At the 
same time, a modem "Judicial Militarism" in the federal courts gives 
great deference to the U.S. military. Resolving these two seemingly 
opposed doctrines is key to achieving justice in Okinawa. 
196. Nat'/ Assn of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1051 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 
(1969)). 
197. 545 u.s. 1 (2005). 
198. ld at 17 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). 
199. Knox, supra note 162, at 392-93 IU1.250; 260-261. The Massey court noted these 
cases, mostly involving patent, antitrust, or trademark laws, in its decision. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. 
v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 
(1952); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Laker Airways Ltd. 
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
200. Morrison v. Nat'! Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
201. ld at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 
u.s. 155, 177 (1993)). 
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A. Applying NEPA and the ESA to the Okinawa Base Siting Is 
Consistent with the Environmental Justice Doctrine Incorporated 
into Federal Decision Making 
On the federal level, "environmental justice" is an executive branch 
doctrine ultimately based on the United States Constitution's guarantee of 
"equal protection" and various federal laws. 202 It has been left 
undisturbed by Congress and administrations of different political parties 
for the past twenty years. 
Environmental justice as a doctrine began with a social protest 
movement in the 1980s.203 The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) under the George W Bush Administration began reporting 
and documenting the problem in the United States. 204 The social 
movement reached a national consensus in what was declared to be a 
"People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit" in 1991.205 That 
Summit was notable for not only the convening of national activists, but 
also for its articulation of the "Principles of Environmental Justice."206 
These Principles have a global perspective and mark that activists had 
gathered "to begin to build a national and international movement of all 
peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands and 
communities." 207 Many of the principles reflect this international 
theme.208 • 
202. . U.S. CONST. amend. XIY, § 1; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (2012); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); see 
Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 27,9, 280 (Feb. I 1, I 994). 
The author has comprehensively examined the federal doctrine in Ramo, supra note 126. 
203. Dollie Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle: Wamm 
County Before and Ailer, 1 GoLDEN GATE U. ENVn. L.J. 9, I 0 (2007). 
204. See Environmental Equil)'. Reducing Risk for All Communities (EPA 230-R-92-008), 
U.S. ENVn. PRar. AGENCY 2-3 (June 1992), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources!reports/ 
annual-project-reportslreducing_risk_com__vol2.pdf. 
205. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Centuiy, ENVTL. JusT. 
REsoURCE CENTER, http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/ejinthe21century.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2014) 
("The [Summit] was probably the most important single event in the movement's history."). 
ld 
206. The Principles of Environmental Justice (EJ), supra note 2. 
207. /d 
208. Key international principles include: 
2. Environmental Justice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and 
justice for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias .... 
5. Environmental Justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural 
and environmental self-determination of all peoples. . . . 10. Environmental Justice 
considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation of international 
law. . . . 15. Environmental Justice opposes military occupation, repression and 
exploitation of lands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms. 
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The movement culminated in President Clinton's environmental 
justice executive order addressing "disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects" on "minority" and "low-income 
populations" in the United States and its territories.209 The executive 
order was followed by numerous reports and policies adopted by federal 
agencies to implement the order.210 The EPA defined "environmental 
justice" broadly as 
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and 
policies. . . . Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences 
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or 
policies.'.l1' 
President Clinton identified NEPA as a key tool for environmental 
justice in his memorandum accompanying his executive prder.212 The 
EPA has affirmed the relationship between NEPA and environmental 
justice.213 Given the disproportionate impacts from military bases in 
Okinawa on its minority population, discussed in Parts III and IV above, 
NEPA as well as the ESA seem essential to comprehensively address the 
environmental justice impacts from the Okinawa base relocation. 
B. A Modem "Judicial Militarism" Nevertheless Gives Great 
Deference to the Military 
Opposed to the application of environmental justice principles 
through the extraterritorial use ofNEPA or the ESA for the U.S. Okinawa 
base siting is the increasingly ·powerful doctrine of great judicial 
deference in military matters, a kind of "judicial militarism." Historically, 
as described above, foreign policy· concerns were a factor driving the 
principle against the extraterritoriality of U.S. statutes. Added to this 
historical wariness is a more modem capitulation to military 
209. Exec. Order No. 12,898,59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). The full title is Federal 
Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations. 
Jd 
210. Eg., Dep't of Def., Strategy on Environmental Justice, DENIX (Mar. 24, 1995), 
http://www.denix.osd.miV/references/upload/DoD-Environmental-Justice-Strategy-24-Mar-1995. 
pdf. 
211 . Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PRar. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/environmental 
justice/basics/index.html (last updated May 24, 2012). 
212. Memorandum of Environmental Justice, supra note 202, at 280. 
213. Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA's NEPA 
Compliance Analyses, U.S. ENVTL. PRar. AGENCY § 1 (Apr. 1998), http://www.epa.gov/environ 
mentaljusticelresources/policy-ej-guidance-nepa-epa0498.pdf. 
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considerations in the context of a culture where "Americans are 
enthralled with military power."214 
The aftermath of the Vietnam War was a crucial time for the 
country as it reconsidered its attitude towards the military. As Boston 
University Professor Andrew J. Bacevich, a Vietnam Veteran, put it: 
"The new American militarism made its appearance in reaction to the 
1960s and especially to Vietnam.'ms 
For most Americans, the Vietnam War was seen as a disaster that 
should never be repeated, and it is ,no surprise that Senator McGovern's 
campaign theme for President in 1972 was that the United States should 
come home.216 The neoconservatives learned a different lesson. For them, 
"military power-not merely adequate, but superior power-was for the 
United States .a sine qua non."217 Vietnam was a disaster because the 
military was restrained and not allowed to do its job. As President 
Reagan put it: "They came home;without a victory not because they'd 
been defeated, but because they'd been denied permission to win."218 
As this post-Vietnam militarism evolved, the U.S. military 
emphasized the need to intervene with overwhelming force, without 
undue interference from civilian institutions. 219 Perpetual military 
preparedness around the world was the preeminent strategy, with bases in 
more than 100 countries220 and an isolated voluntary mi}itary firmly 
supported, if not participated in, by the general public.221 
Supreme Court decisions involving the military reflected these 
political dynamics and changes. In the 1950s and '60s, the Court had no 
hesitation in reigning in military jurisdiction, noting its anti-democratic 
characteristics. In Reid v. Cove~ the Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision, 
held that military criminal jurisdiction overseas during tiffies of peace 
does not extend to civilian dependents, upholding the civilian court's 
214. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN Mn.ITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE 
SEDUCEDBYWAR 1 (2013). 
215. Id at 5-6 (citing Norman Podhoretz, Making the World Safe for Communism, 
COMMENTARY (Apr. 1, 1976), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/making-the-world-
safe-for-communism/). 
216. ld at 74. 
21 7. Id (citing Norman Podhoretz, The NcxrConservative Anguish over Reagan s Foreign 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1982, (Magazine), at 30). 
218. ld at 107 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Presenting the Medal of Honor to 
Master Sergeant Roy P. Benavidez, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 24, 1981), http://www. 
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43454 ). 
219. /dat48,5i-52. 
220. ld at 17 (citing CHALMERS ioHNSON, THE SORROWS OF E~IRE, MILITARISM, 
SECRECY,ANDTHEENDOFTHEREPUBLIC 154 (2004)). 
221. Id at 22-23. 
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ability to issue a writ of habeas corpus.222 Justice Black, in a plurality 
opinion for the Court, which included Chief Justice Warren and Justices 
Douglas and Brennan, stated, "Every extension of mili~ jurisdiction is 
an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more 
important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other 
treasured constitutional protections."223 Justice Black went further by 
noting the Founders' Constitution's healthy distrust of the military, "a 
necessary institution, but one dangerous to 4berty if not confined within 
its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They knew that 
ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders."224 
Justice Black also reJected that Cold War tensions and the need for 
military preparedness were sufficient bases for the expansion of military 
jurisdiction where there was no actual conflict. 225 
Similarly, the Supreme Court restricted jurisdiction over discharged 
soldiers,226 civilian overseas employees,227 and even those in the service 
where their crimes are not "service connected."228 By 1972, the Supreme 
Court was even willing to assert civilian judicial control over a 
serviceman claiming to be a conscientious objector facing a court-
martial for refusing to board a plane to Vietnam.229 The Court in Parisi v. 
Davidson unanimously found no reason to restrain civilian jurisdiction 
out of"comity" for a pending military court-martial.230 Justice Douglas's 
concurrence in Pansi is a bold assertion of the need for civilian courts ''to 
keep the military within bounds."231 According to Justice Douglas: 
"[T]he Pentagon is not yet sovereign. The military is simply another 
administrative agency, insofar as judicial review is concemed."232 
But once the Nixon appointees Justice William Rehnquist ~d Chief 
Justice Warren Burger were on the Court, and with the new conservative 
doctrine that the Vietnam disaster was a result of civilian meddling in the 
military's affairs, the tide began to shift towards judicial militarism. With 
Justice Rehnquist participating, Chief Justice Burger in a 5-4 decision in 
222. 354 u.s. 1, 39-40 (1957). 
223. Id at 21. 
224. Id at 23-24. 
225. See id at 35. 
226. United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955) (quoting U.S.CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 14). 
227. McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (1959). 
228. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,272-73 (1969). 
229. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,45 (1972). 
230. Id at 46. Notably the new Justice Rehnquist, appointed by President Nixon, did not 
participate in the case. 
231. Id at 49 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
232. Id at 51 (citing Comment, supmnote 1, at 377-78). 
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Laird v. Tatum upheld a military domestic intelligence-gathering 
program from a challenge, m arguing that there was no justiciable 
controversy because the mere existence of the program did not constitute 
a present or future harm. 234 
Justice Douglas vehemently dissented: "Our tradition reflects a 
desire for civilian supremacy and subordination of military power."235 He 
further emphasized the difference between judicial deference in 
peacetime to a time of declared war: "In times of peace, the factors 
leading to an extraordinary deference to claims of military necessity have 
naturally not been as weighty. This has been true even in the all too 
imperfect peace that has been our lot for the past fifteen years--and quite 
rightly so, in my judgment."236 
By 1974, the Supreme Court's new majority fully embraced and 
articulated this shift towards a judicial militarism. In a 6-2 decision, 
Justice Rehnquist for the Court in Parker v. Levy upheld the court-
martial of an Army Captain for statements against the Vietnam War.237 
The Captain argued that the application of a Uniform Code of Military 
Justice provision prohibiting "conduct unbecomjng an officer and a 
gentleman"238 to political statements was improper as unconstitutionally 
vague. 
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning was dramatically different from the 
prior court decisions described above. He spoke of the different 
"military community."239 He then concluded that a lesser standard of 
scrutiny applies to the military society than to civilian society "[b ]ecause 
of the factors differentiating military society from civilian society."240 
In one fell swoop, the military went from being just another 
administrative agency to a "society" entitled to deference as long as it is 
not arbitrary. Thus even First Amendment protections must be adjusted 
for the military given that ''the different character of the military 
233. 408 u.s. 1 (1972). 
234. See id at 13-16. Justice Burger still feels the need to defend the civilian jurisdiction 
of the courts over the military, noting the "traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any 
military intrusion into civilian affairs" and "our traditional insistence on limitations on military 
operations in peacetime." Jd at 15. 
235. Jd at 19 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
236. ld at 20 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.YU. L. REv. 
181, 193 (1962)). Notably, those years include the time during the Vietnam War. 
237. 417 u.s. 733 (1974). 
238. 10 u.s.c. § 933 (2012). 
239. Parker,417U.S.at752. 
240. ld at 756. 
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community and of the military mission requires a different application of 
those protections."w 
This trend continued in a series of key decisions authored by Justice 
Rehnquist. In Goldman v. Weinberger, a 5-4 split-court upheld Air Force 
regulations prohibiting a Rabbi on active duty in a health clinic from 
wearing a Yarmulke.242 Justice Rehnquist again wrote of the greater 
deference given the military "to accomplish its mission:~ '243 "[C]ourts 
must give great deference to the professional judgment of military 
authorities concerning the relative' importance of a particular military 
interest."244 He complained of courts being "ill-equipped to determine 
the impact _upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military 
authority might have."145 
This sweeping deference to the military was new and was properly 
identified by Justice Brennan in dissent: ''The Court, however, evades its 
responsibility by eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of 
military regulations that interfere with the fundamental constitutional 
rights of service personnel."246 Or as Justice O'Connor stated in dissent, 
"It is entirely sufficient for the Court if the military perceives a need for 
uniformity."247 
One year later, Justice Rehnquist led the charge to overrule 
O'CaUahan v. Parkerin Solano v. United States, which gave the military 
jurisdiction over service personnel committing non-service connected 
charges.248 Justice Rehnquist repeated that courts are "ill-equipped" to 
address military matters and that judicial deference is at its "apogee" 
when addressing rules and regulations of the Armed Forces.249 
C Judicial Militansm Has Impacted but Not Eliminated the 
ApplicatJon ofNEPA and the ESA to the Military 
The Supreme Court's modern deference to the military is having 
significant impact upon environmental laws. In Weinberger v. Catholic 
ActJon of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, Justice Rehnquist for the 
Court exempted the Navy from preparing an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) under NEPA before completing weapons storage 
241. Id at 758. 
242. 475 u.s. 503 (1986). 
243. ld at 507 (citing Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 294,300 (1983)). 
244. Jd (citing Chappel, 462 U.S. at 305). 
245. ld (quoting Chappel, 462 U.S. at 305). 
246. Id at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
247. ld at 528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
248. 483 U.S. 435,448 (1987) (citing Chappel, 462 U.S. at 305). 
249. ld at447 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,508 (1986)). 
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facilities in Hawaii that could store nuclear weapons.250 The Navy had 
done an environmental impact assessment (EIA), finding no significant 
impacts, but had failed to evaluate the impacts from storing nuclear 
weapons because the Navy never reveals if or where it is storing nuclear 
weapons.251 The Ninth Circuit suggested that the Navy do a hyPothetical 
EIS to evaluate whether or not nuclear weapons were stored at the site.252 
Justice Rehnquist fmmd that the Freedom of Information Act's 
(FOIA) exception for government secrets applied: "Congress intended 
that the· public's interest in ensuring that federal agencies comply with 
NEPA must give way to the Government's need to preserve military 
secrets."253 Justice Rehnquist rejected the circuit court's attempt to 
accommodate NEPA to military secrecy through a hypothetical EIS: 
"[W]e have held that 'public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit 
in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the 
disclosure of matters which law itself regards as confidential, and 
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.'"254 
In Weinbe.rger v. Romero-Barcelo, the Court found that the Navy 
was subject to the federal Clean Water Act and therefore needed a permit 
before discharging bombs in a training exercise in the ocean near an 
island off of Puerto Rico.255 However, the Court also endorsed the district 
court's refusal to give an injunction to stop the bombing: "[B]ecause of 
the importance of the island as a training center, 'the granting of the 
injunctive relief sought would cause grievous; and perhaps irreparable 
harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general welfare of the 
Nation. "'256 
More recently the Supreme Court took a more aggressive step in 
Wmter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 257 Chief Justice 
Roberts, a former clerk to Justice Rehnquist,258 wrote for a five-vote 
majority holding that a preliminary injunction to stop the Navy from 
sonar training off the Southern California coast in a manner to protect 
marine mammals was inappropriate.259 Justice Roberts framed the case 
250. 454 u.s. 139 (1981). 
251. Jd at 141. 
252. Jd at 140-41 (citing Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 
569, 572 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
253 . Id at 145. 
254. Id at 146-47 (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)). 
255. 456 u.s. 305, 306-07, 320 (1982). 
256. ld at 310 (quoting Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 707 (D.P.R. 1979)). 
257. 555 u.s. 7, 26 (2008). 
258. Biographies of Current Justice of the Supreme Cowt, ~UP. CT. U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutlbiographies.aspx (last visited July 7, 2014). 
259. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 
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as one involving military professional judgment, and once so framed, he 
discussed the doctrines of great deferral and the inadequacy of the courts 
to determine the case: 
This case involves "complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force," which 
are "essentially professional military judgments." We "give great 
deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning 
the relative importance of a particular military interest." As the Court 
emphasized just last Term, "neither the Members of this Court nor most 
federal judges begin the day with briefmgs that may describe new and 
serious threats to our Nation and its people.',260 • 
Justice Roberts accepted without questioning the Navy's 
declarations that the district court's restrictions on sonar training in this 
area of the ocean would jeopardize its "realistic training" exercise. that "is 
of the utmost importance to the Navy and the Nation."261 He concluded 
that the balance of equities therefore "tip strongly in favor of the Navy": 
For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury would be harm to an 
unknown number of the marine mammals that they study and observe. In 
contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine 
force jeopardizes the safety of the fleet. Active sonar is the only reliable 
technology for detecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines, 
and the President-the Commander in Chief-has determined that training 
with active sonar is "essential to national security.'o262 
Notice how Justice Roberts converted a, single training program in one 
area of the ocean with restrictions into "an inadequately trained 
antisubmarine force" that ')eopardizes the safety of the fleet." He did 
this based on what he characterizes as the "credibly alleged" claim of a 
threat to national security. 263 
Yet even with this great deference, none of these cases found 
environmental law to be inapplicable to the U.S. military, nor did the 
military make that claim. As described above, in Catholic Action of 
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the Navy did perform an EIA pursuant 
to NEPA, and the court merely reconciled the FOIA and NEPA. The 
Navy also was required to obtain a Clean Water Act permit in Romero-
Barcelo. The Navy in Wintei.S' did do an EIA, and the Court never 
260. Id (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 
U.S. 503, 507 ( 1986); Bownedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)). 
261. /d at 25. 
262. Id at 26 (quoting Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 232a, Wmtcr, 
555 U.S. 7 (No. 07-1239)). 
263. Id at 32-33. 
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reached the issue of whether it needed to do an EIS, only addressing 
whether an injunction was appropriate. None of these cases preclude 
applying environmental law to the U.S. military. 
D. Judicial Militansm Should Be Questioned; However, in Okinawa, 
NEPA and the ESA Do Not Conflict with MJ1itary Necessity and 
Should Apply 
This evolution in deferral to the military's claims of military 
necessity is daunting for those challenging military authority. However, 
the historical and ideological roots of this great deferral doctrine may 
well be worth questioning. There are many reasons to question the 
political stance that the failure in Vietnam had anything to do with 
civilian interference with the U.S. military.264 This questioning may be 
ripe now as the United States confronts its post-Iraq withdrawal debacle, 
suggesting that U.S. military misadventures may have more to do with 
fundamental policy failure than with too much civilian restraint on the 
military.265 Judicial militarism is not a constitutional doctrine and should 
not be of service to political agendas to eliminate the post-Vietnam 
syndrome and encourage foreign military intervention. 
Yet, even with the full force of this modem capitulation to the 
"military society," none of these cases weighing military necessity and 
environmental protection hold the military to be immune from 
environmental statutes. The key, given the current court's militaristic 
paradigm, is to show that there is no real conflict between asserting 
environmental laws' extraterritorially and military necessity. 
There is no dispute that Okinawa still provides a strategic value to 
the U.S. military, given conflicts with North Korea and China. 266 
However, it is a different matter as to the "number of marines necessary 
264. Based upon the so-called "Pentagon Papers," it is far more likely the war's failure 
resulted from bad policy conducted with too little transparency about trying to suppress a war of 
independence conducted by determined people. Sec DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: f\ MEMOIR OF 
VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 249-55 (2002). 
265. See Peter Beinart, Obama s Disastrous Iraq Policy: An Autopsy, ATLANTIC (June 23, 
2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2014/06/obamas-disastrous-
iraq-policy-an-autopsy/373225/, and Fareed Zakaria, Mlo Lost Iraq? The Iraqis Did, with an 
Assist /ivm George W Bush, WASH. POST (June 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/fareed-zakaria-who-lost-lraq-the-lraqis-did-with-an-assist-from-george-w-bush/2014/06/ 
12/35c5a418-F25c-ll e3-914c-1 fbd0614e2d4_Story.html, for examples of this questioning from 
different perspect1ves. 
266. CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 25, at 2 ("The U.S. military presence in 
Japan, and particularly Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the Asia-
Pacific region.''). 
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to maintain stability ' and their specific location.267 At least three key U.S. 
senators in 20 ll and 2012 questioned the realignment plan and 
wondered why the MCAS Futenma operations were not consolidated 
with the Air Force's Kadena Air Base.268 • 
In the case of the Okinawan dugong, where the U.S. military and 
Japan have taken almost a decade to resolve the location of the MCAS 
Futenma, there is no immediate necessity for rushing a decision, which 
allows for a full environmental analysis to be conducted. The problem 
was not that military necessity prevented the DOD from considering the 
impacts to the dugong. The DOD claimed it was willing and in fact did 
con8ider the impacts with a variety of studies, but they did so in a 
patently flawed manner. 269 
Further, the United States and Japan have recognized that applying 
U.S. environmental laws to U.S. bases is consistent with their national 
interests. The SCC on September 11, 2000, issued a "Joint Statement of 
Environment Principles," noting "the increasing importance of protecting 
the environment."270 The goal is to prevent "pollution on facilities and 
areas the use of which is granted to the U.S. armed forces."27 1 The 
methodology for protection is "selecting the more protective standards 
from relevant U.S. and Japanese laws and regulations."272 Both countries 
recognized that there was no conflict with domestic Japanese laws in 
picking more stringent U.S. laws for compliance: "[U.S. armed forces in 
Japan] environmental standards generally meet or exceed those set by 
relevant laws and regulations of Japan."273 
The illusion that there is a conflict between military necessity and 
base siting arose in a case related to the situation in Okinawa, . though 
267. ld 
268. ld at I I (referring to Carl Levin, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John 
McCain, ranking minority member of that committee; and Jim Webb, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs). 
269. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1109-11 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
270. Joint Statement of Environmental Principles, MINISTRY FORF.IG AFF. JAPAN (Sept. 11, 
2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/regionln-america/us/seeurity/environment.html. 
271. ld 
272. Id 
273. ld The United States and Japan more recently reaffirmed these principles in a joint 
press statement, pledging again to use "the more protective of U.S. standards, generally applied 
and enforced Japanese national standards, or any applicable international agreement standards." 
Joint Announcement on a Framework Regarding Environmental Stewardship at US. Anned 
Forces Facilities and Areas in Japan, U.S. EMBASSY JAPAN (Dec. 23, 2013), http://japan. 
usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131225-0l.html. In addition, both countries agreed to negotiate new 
agreements based upon "taking environmental measures around the U.S. Armed Forces facilities 
and areas to improve further environmentally friendly living conditions of both local communities 
and those with in the U.S. Armed Forces facilities and areas." Jd 
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significantly, it occurred in a U.S. territory, thereby avoiding the 
extraterritoriality issue. Part of the realignment of Okinawa's U.S. bases 
involves sending 9,000 Marines to Guam.274 The Navy chose a site for a 
firing range that is sacred to the indigenous people· of Guam and listed on 
the National Register of Historic Places. Local activists and the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation sued under NEPA, the NHPA, and the 
Coastal Zone Management Act. They argued that there were alternative 
sites reasonably available, among other arguments.275 
Negotiations during the Guam case were soon met by claims of 
military necessity, with at least one military official looking at the 
plaintiffs' activists and lawyers and reportedly ~aying, "[I]f we don't put 
it there, your children will die."276 Yet, the Navy eventually agreed to do a 
supplemental EIS and evaluate additional alternatives. After a two-year 
evaluation, the Navy found an available alternative site at an existing Air 
Force base that will not affect sacred land. 277 
The fact that Guam is a territory and Okinawa is a former de facto 
colony should not be a significant determinant in balancing 
environmental val:ues with military necessity. Congress's essential 
message in both NEPA and the ESA is that protecting environmental 
values nationally and internationally is consistent with the national 
interest. That insight is what led the CEQ to issue its memorandum 
supporting NEPA extraterritoriality: 
We believe that by taking account of likely impacts abroad before deciding 
on a proposal for action, federal agencies can obtain the same benefits of 
NEPA review that accompany the development of projects or actions-
with domestic impacts. Moreover, we believe such analyses can be 
accomplished without imposing U.S. environmental standaids on other 
countries, and without interfering with the execution of foreign policy. To 
the contrary, such analysis and disclosure can provide useful information to 
cooperating governments. Finally, if agencies undertake these analyses in 
cooperation with involved foreign governments, U.S. agencies can promote 
274. Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Voluntary Remand and Stay at 2, Guam Pres. 
Trust v. Gregory, No. 10-00677,41 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,221 (D. Haw. 2011). 
275. Id at4. 
276. Conversation with Nicholas Yost, Plaintiffs' Lawyer (Feb. 25, 20 14). Nicholas Yost is 
the former CEQ general counsel and the recipient of the American Bar Association's 2010 Award 
for Distinguished Achievement in Environmental Law and Policy. Nicholas C .IV~ DENfONS, 
http://www.dentons.com/en/nicholas-yost (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
277. Matthew M. Burke, New Navy Report Could Clear ~y for Marines' Move fivm 
Okinawa to Guam, STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/new-navy-
report-could-clear-way-for-marines-move-from-okinawa-to-guam-1.278611. 
2014] EXTRA1ERRITORIALENVIRONMENTALIMPACTS 93 
international approaches to environmental protection as recommended in 
the Stockholm Declaration and elsewhere.278 
The same could be said in regard to the principles of.environme!J.tal 
justice. If Okinawa was a legal U.S. territory, there would be no question 
that Okinawans are a minority population that have not been given "fair 
treatment" because they "bear a disproportionate share of the negative 
environmental consequences" resulting from the U.S. base . siting 
decisions.279 
Respecting the Okinawan population and its cultural and 
environmental heritage is not antithetical to military interests or foreign 
policy. There is no need for an immediate relocation, as discussed above, 
implicating the injunction issues addressed in Wmtei.S' and Romero-
Barcelo. The United States has agreed with Japan to "delink" the base 
relocation from its other plans for withdrawing troops from Okinawa.280 
It will be years before the expansion can be built, and there are no 
immediate training exercises.281 There is no valid military or foreign 
policy reason to avoid applying U.S. environmental laws to the Okinawa 
base relocation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The conflict over the MCAS Futenma relocation is an opportunity 
for the U.S. military to address long-standing environmental justice 
issues in Okinawa. Applying U.S. environmental laws to the DOD's 
decisions regarding base locations in Okinawa enhances rather than 
undermines foreign policy and military interests. The commitment to 
environniental justice is particularly apt given Okinawa's cultural and 
social history, its occupation and postoccupation status after reversion, 
and its continued disproportionate burden from the U.S. military's bases 
and operations. 
The core value in environmental justice, mutual respect between 
decision-makers and the community affected, can lead to a better 
solution. It can also be an example of how preserving one endangered 
278. Russell W. Peterson, Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Applying the EIS 
Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad (Sept. 24, 1976), 42 Fed. Reg. 61,068 (Dec. 1, 
1977). 
279. Environmental Justice, supmnote 211. 
280. Sec'y of Def. et al., Joint Statement of the Secun'ty Consultative Committee, 
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/ 
security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf("(T]he Ministers decided to delink both the 'relocation of 
the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land . 
returns· south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenrna Replacement Facility."). 
281. Slavin, Sumida & Harper, supm note 114. 
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species, the Okinawa dugong, is intimately related to building a 
sustainable human community. The U.S. federal courts, by properly 
applying principles of extraterritoriality and asserting their constitutional 
role in reviewing military activities, are in a position to assure justice for 
Okinawans. 
